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DEALING WITH THE AFTERMATH OF THE
WORKPLACE SAFETY AND INSURANCE ACT, 1997
GARTH DEE*
RESUMEt
Cet article dcrit de mani~re g~n~rale l'orientation des modifications apport~es au
syst~me d'indemnisation des accident6s du travail qui rrsulte de la Loi de 1997 sur la
sicuriti professionnelle et l' assurance contre les accidents du travail. Ces modifica-
tions sont A la fois d'ordre substantiel et srmantique. L'auteur aborde ensuite, de la
perspective d'un drfenseur des travailleurs accidentrs, un certain nombre de
changements et de tendances au sein du regime d'indemnisation des accidentrs du
travail. Parmi les questions abordres, on compte la baisse du volume des reclamations;
les effets des d~lais de prescription sur la defense des travailleurs accident~s; les taux
d'6valuation des employeurs; la culture organisationnelle de la Commission de la
srcurit6 professionnelle et de l'assurance contre les accidents du travail (CSPAAT);
les nominations politiques au sein du Tribunal d'appel de la srcurit6 professionnelle
et de l'assurance contre les accidents du travail; le processus d'61aboration des
politiques de la CSPAAT; l'impartition des services de rrintrgration au march6 du
travail; et les drficiences du syst~me de rrembauchage/perte de gains.
INTRODUCTION: A TIME OF CHANGE
There have been a huge number of changes brought about to workers' compensation
in Ontario by the passage of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997, which
came into effect as of January 1, 1998.1 These legislative changes have come into
effect at the same time as the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board (the Board) has
instituted a number of major administrative changes to reorganize the manner in which
it adjudicates claims for compensation arising from workplace injuries.
* Garth Dee was called to the Ontario Bar in 1985. He has worked in the area of workers' compensa-
tion since his first year of law school as a law student with the Union of Injured Workers' legal
clinic. Following his call to the Bar he has accumulated experience with the workers' compensation
system from a number of perspectives, including employment in the Tribunal Counsel Office of the
Workers' Compensation Appeals Tribunal, in private practice, as the Director of the Benefits Policy
Branch of the Workers' Compensation Board and currently as a staff lawyer with the Northumber-
land Community Legal Centre, a community legal clinic located in Cobourg, Ontario. He is also a
co-author of G. Dee, N. McCombie & G. Newhouse, Butterworths Workers' Compensation in
Ontario Service, 2d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1999 [updated semi-annually]).
1. S.O. 1997, c.16, Sch.A [hereinafter WSIA or Act].
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This article does not list and document in a comprehensive way all of the various
changes that the compensation system has seen over the last year. Instead, this article
focusses on a number of topics that I have found to be of interest over the last year.
These topics are as follows:
1. The Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997: Substance and Semantics
2. The Importance of Workers' Compensation: A Shrinking System
3. The Changing Nature of Workers' Compensation Advocacy
4. Finances of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board: Creative Accounting II
5. The Workplace Safety and Insurance Board: More Corporate and More Uncaring
6. Appointments to the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal:
De-Skilling and Re-Politicising the Appeals Tribunal
7. Policy Issues and the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal
8. The Workplace Safety and Insurance Board's Policy Development and Publica-
tion Processes
9. Outsourcing Labour Market Re-entry Services
10. Holes in the Re-Employment/Wage Loss System
A. Employer Hardball Tactics
B. When Re-Employment Ends
C. Loss of Liberty
1. THE WORKPLACE SAFETYAND INSURANCE ACT, 1997: SUBSTANCE
AND SEMANTICS
The driving force behind the passage of the Act was money. Employers and the
government both wished to reduce the size of the Board's unfunded liability and the
size of the employer assessments required to fund the workers' compensation system. 2
The government's approach to achieving its objectives was twofold.
First, the government seized upon ideas and trends already present within the workers'
compensation system that were leading to drastically reduced workers' compensation
costs and appropriated those ideas as its own.
Second, the government cut the level of benefits available to injured workers. Amongst
these changes were a lowered rate of inflation adjustment, a reduction of benefits from
ninety per cent of net to eighty-five per cent of net; a cutting in half of the statutory
protection against the loss of post-retirement income; and a prohibition on stress
claims. The sleeper amongst the potential benefit reductions is the potential ability of
2. See, for e.g., D.K. Wilken, "Manufacturing Crisis in Workers' Compensation" (1998) 13 J.L. &
Social Pol'y 124.
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the Board, through regulation, to restrict compensation for "chronic pain". 3 Chronic
pain is not defined in the Act but is left to be defined by regulation.
Existing trends in cost reduction and in the improvement of the finances of the
workers' compensation system would have in all likelihood continued even if the
government had done nothing. However, what the government did instead of doing
nothing or instead of just tinkering with the benefit system was to leave in place most
of the substance of the existing wage loss and re-employment system that has been
driving the cost reductions but change the language that is used to describe this system
so as to appropriate credit for the concepts driving this cost reduction.
While there were some substantive changes introduced to the wage loss/re-employ-
ment system, the most obvious of the changes that were introduced were semantic.
The name of the Act governing the workers' compensation system was changed and
the Act has been completely reorganized. The legislative purpose clause in the Act was
changed. The Workers' Compensation Board (WCB) became the Workplace Safety
and Insurance Board. A similar name change took place with the Appeals Tribunal.
The name of the statute itself changed. As well, the Act no longer provides for
vocational rehabilitation services. It instead provides for "early and safe return to work
programs (ESRTW's)" and "labour market re-entry plans (LMRP's)".
The overall objective of the new semantics is to de-emphasize the role of compensation
payments as a method of protecting workers from the potential for catastrophic loss
due to injury and also to de-emphasize the importance of a government controlled
centralized agency in administering the measures intended to provide this protection.
The substantial aspects of this "new" emphasis pre-date the WSIA. Ever since the
adoption of a wage loss system in 1990, there has been an ever increasing shift in
responsibility away from financial compensation from the Board and towards the
workplace parties, most particularly individual employers, to find ways of reducing
workers' compensation costs. This has been achieved through the increased re-
employment of injured workers or at least through increased offers of re-employment
to injured workers. These changes have been largely responsible for rapidly falling
costs per claim within the workers' compensation system since 1990 and for increased
rates of injured worker re- employment within reported claims. This shifting respon-
sibility within the workers' compensation system has been in many ways similar to
the shift in responsibility regarding occupational health and safety matters. This is a
shift away from a centralized command and control model of enforcement towards a
more decentralized internal responsibility model. The shift in focus is demonstrated
most clearly in the changes that have taken place in the purposes clause.
The legislative purpose clause of the former Workers'Compensation Act,4 section 0.1,
is as follows:
3. WSIA, supra note 1, s.14(1) & (2).
4. R.S.O. 1990, c.W-1 1, as am. [hereinafter WCA].
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The purpose of this Act is to accomplish the following in a financially responsible
and accountable manner:
1. To provide fair compensation to workers who sustain personal injury arising
out of and in the course of their employment or who suffer from occupational
disease and to their survivors and dependants.
2. To provide health care benefits to those workers.
3. To provide for rehabilitation services and programs to facilitate the workers'
return to work.
4. To provide for rehabilitation programs for their survivors.
5. To prevent or reduce the occurrence of injuries and occupational diseases at
work.
6. To promote health and safety in workplaces.
The legislative purpose clause in section 1 of the new Act states:
The purpose of this Act is to accomplish the following in a financially responsible
and accountable manner:
1. To promote health and safety in workplaces and to prevent and reduce the
occurrence of workplace injuries and occupational diseases.
2. To facilitate the return to work and recovery of workers who sustain personal
injury arising out of and in the course of employment or who suffer from an
occupational disease.
3. To facilitate the re-entry into the labour market of workers and spouses of
deceased workers.
4. To provide compensation and other benefits to workers and to the survivors of
deceased workers.
As a general approach to protecting workers from loss caused by work related injuries,
the purpose clause is not a bad one. The clause reflects an approach to work related
injuries which should be completely supportable by workers. First, reduce the number
of injuries. Second, where injuries do occur, assist injured workers to return to work
because the vast majority of injured workers would prefer a pay cheque to a compen-
sation cheque. Third, where there is loss from injury, compensate the loss.
This type of approach is a great improvement on the old approach which did not
recognize the extent to which both the occurrence of injury and the consequences of
injury are heavily influenced by the adoption of appropriate management techniques.
However, there are at least two major problems with the purpose clause.
The first major problem with the purpose clause is that, as a practical matter, the scope
of the WSIA provisions dealing with occupational health and safety are quite limited.
While health and safety should be the primary focus for reducing the consequences
that flow from work related injury, given the limited provisions dealing with health
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and safety in the Act, it is not accurate to state that the primary purpose of the WSIA
itself is health and safety. Placing the promotion of health and safety as the primary
purpose of the Act diminishes the importance of the other objectives, such as re-
employment and compensation, that do fall squarely within the desired purposes of
the Act from an injured worker's perspective.
The second major problem with the purpose clause is that the word "compensation"
is no longer qualified by the word "fair". Fair is hardly an exacting standard to be held
to. It falls somewhere below "good" and is certainly much below "excellent". The
word fair fits right in there with other such radical words as, for example, "reasonable".
Given the limited practical uses of the purposes clause, the government's refusal to
put the word "fair" back in to qualify "compensation" can most likely be seen as an
effort to further emphasize the very limited role that it is willing to provide for financial
compensation within the workplace insurance scheme.
2. THE IMPORTANCE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION:
A SHRINKING SYSTEM
The single most notable change to the Ontario workers' compensation system over the
last decade is not the adoption of the wage loss system or the reaction of the workplace
parties to the wage loss system. The single most notable change is the huge drop in
reported injuries and the even larger drop in accepted lost time injuries.
According to the Board's 1997 Annual Report, reported injuries dropped from a total
of 487,654 in 1988 to 339,476 in 1997. Lost time injuries dropped from 208,499 in
1988 to 101,806 in 1997. If self-insured Schedule 2 employers are excluded the drop
in lost time claims is even more dramatic going from 185,585 in 1988 to 86,641 in
1997. Claims not allowed increased from nine percent of all claims in 1988 to nineteen
per cent of all claims in 1997.5
There is no one accepted reason for this drop having taken place. Possible explanations
include:
- an actual decrease in work related injuries
- under reporting of injuries and abandonment of claims due to employer intimida-
tion motivated by experience rating
- an increase in the percentage of claims denied by the Board
- worker frustration with dealing with the Board
- employer programs to avoid reporting claims as lost time injuries due to experi-
ence rating
There is plenty of anecdotal evidence from workers' representatives and Board staff
to allow any reasonable observer to conclude that under reporting of injuries due to
5. Ontario, Workplace Safety and Insurance Board, Annual Report 1997.
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employer intimidation is a reality. The question is to what extent does this under
reporting take place and what can be done about it.
The Board has, in the past, done some research to determine whether or not there was
any evidence of under reporting of workplace injuries (there was). However, there are
no indications that the Board is presently concerned at all about the current trends in
accident reporting.
The Board has also not provided any information in its annual reports about why the
number of denied claims as a percentage of all claims is increasing or why the
percentage of claims that are initiated and then abandoned is also increasing.
The sad reality of this situation is that the Board and its senior management appear to
be solely focussed on the financial side of the workers' compensation system: namely,
reducing the unfunded liability and reducing assessment rates for employers. A drop
in the volume of claims and allowed claims is obviously quite helpful to the Board in
addressing its financial situation. Given the focus of the present Board management,
the prospects for significant attention being paid to the under reporting of injuries in
the near future are dim.
3. THE CHANGING NATURE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION
ADVOCACY
The past year was a horrible year to be a workers' compensation advocate. Aside from
the necessity of learning a whole new Act, the introduction of limitation periods on
appeals has significantly impacted the manner in which advocacy services need to be
provided.
In the office where I work, and I expect in the workplaces of most other workers'
compensation advocates, a lot of hours were devoted in both January and June to
ensuring that no decisions in active files were left unappealed if there was any chance
that the worker would want to pursue those claims at a later date. On top of the existing
case load, many more injured workers requested service due to the fact that they had
to pursue their appeals or lose them.
Furthermore, many more hours were devoted to adopting office procedures to deal
with workers' compensation files in such a way as to minimize the potential for
limitation period problems to occur while the files were active in the office.
One of the features of workers' compensation that drew me to workers' compensation
advocacy as a law student was the informality of the system. There were few rules of
evidence and an absence of legalistic procedures. The informality of process also
allowed a lot of persons who are not lawyers to participate as legal representatives in
workers' compensation proceedings. Depending upon the training and the motivation
of the individuals who provided advocacy services, a lot of good work could be done
on behalf of an injured worker.
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Another nice thing about the workers' compensation system that encouraged the
involvement of new representatives was that a poorly trained, inexperienced, or
disorganized representative, while perhaps not doing as well as a properly trained and
motivated representative might have, would not all that often make things worse for
the worker than the worker would have experienced in dealing with the Board on his
or her own.
With the passage of the WSIA and the adoption of limitation periods on appeal, it is
now very likely that a disorganized or poorly trained representative will end up doing
serious harm to an injured worker's claim.
My guess is that civil liability or the threat of civil liability due to missed limitation
periods will drive out a number of representatives who used to provide workers'
compensation services. Not too many will mourn the departure of a number of the fly
by night ten per centers. However, the threat of liability, and the simple fear of
screwing up, will also be experienced by unions and injured worker groups who
provide a vital service to the injured worker community. This threatens to change the
very nature of worker side advocacy in the workers' compensation system.
At a minimum, the steps required to deal with workers' compensation claims in an
environment with limitation periods is as follows:
- Representatives must consistently refuse to do anything that might create an
expectation that they are looking after an injured workers' claim until such time
as the representative is fully aware of the timelines for appeals and is ready to
accept the responsibility for meeting them. The representative must also ensure
that if there is a time lapse between the first contact with the injured worker and
the time that they take on responsibility for the file, that the injured worker is
made aware of the importance of meeting any limitation periods that might
expire in the meantime.
- Written agreements are required between the injured worker and the representa-
tive specifying exactly what services the representative is responsible for provid-
ing and what services the representative is not responsible for providing.
- A working environment must exist where no letters or faxes can be received with-
out coming to the notice of the representative and there must be an adequate fil-
ing system for dealing with the correspondence.
- A tickler system and standardized follow-up system must be in place.
- Work loads must be controlled.
While it is possible and vital that non-lawyers continue to provide workers' compen-
sation advocacy, it is no longer possible to approach workers' compensation advocacy
on a casual basis. The days of the unsupported part-timer with a disorganized file
cabinet full of files that he or she gets to when they have time has gone. If the threat
of liability is to be survived, and services are to continue from non-profit sources, it
is important that steps be taken by all such representatives to deal with the reality of
limitation periods.
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4. FINANCES OF THE WORKPLACE SAFETY AND INSURANCE BOARD:
CREATIVE ACCOUNTING II
I have previously written about the significant under reporting of assets by the Board
as a result of its use of carrying values instead of market values on its audited financial
statements. 6 I will not repeat my observations here except to state that for the years
1995, 1996, and 1997, the Board has seen improvements of its financial position of
approximately a billion dollars per year. These figures are obtained before taking into
consideration projected cost savings due to the new Act. Furthermore, the Board's
unfunded liability was by my estimate, at the end of 1997, approximately 6 billion
dollars rather than the 8 billion dollars reported on the Board's official balance sheet.
The observation that I would like to make at this point is with respect to workers'
compensation assessment rates in Ontario.
For quite a while it was very common for alarmist employer groups to go on about the
average assessment rate in Ontario verses the average assessment rate in other
provinces and American states. It was very common to see reported an average
assessment rate in Ontario in excess of $3.00 per $100.00 payroll. This rate, the
employer groups told us, was a disaster by comparison to the provincial and state
jurisdictions that compete with Ontario, and this rate just had to come down. Almost
always, the average assessment rate cited would be the inaccurate gross figure which
did not include the extremely large New Experimental Experience Rating Plan
(NEER) off balances that were rebated to employers.
The Board's 1997 Annual Report indicates that, in 1997, assessment rates averaged
$2.85 per hundred dollars payroll before experience rating net refunds. The figure net
of experience rating refunds is typically not reported. However, based on information
contained the 1997 Annual Report, it can be calculated that the net assessment rate for
1997 would have been approximately $2.52 per hundred dollars payroll.7
Even net of experience rating rebates, this average assessment rate includes in it the
assessment rate funds payable for health and safety associations and for funds used
for the reduction of the unfunded liability. These costs, which are paid through the
workers' compensation assessments rates of Ontario employers, either do not exist in
other jurisdictions or are not treated in the same manner in the assessment rates in
other jurisdictions where workers' compensation assessments are focussed more
closely on recovering the compensation costs of current claims.
A more accurate picture of how "expensive" the current Ontario workers' compensa-
tion system is for comparative purposes would be obtained by comparing current costs
to current costs.
6. G. Dee, "Creative Accounting and the Board's 1997 Annual Report" The IAVGO Reporting Service
12:3 (January 1999) 1.
7. Supra note 5 at 20.
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Based upon information in the WSIB's 1997 Annual Report, for comparisons with the
current costs of benefits paid in other jurisdictions, the average rate of $2.52 per
hundred dollars payroll needs to be reduced by $0.84 per hundred dollars payroll for
unfunded liability payments and $0.14 per hundred dollars payroll for other legislated
obligations not involving workers' compensation payments.
With these reductions, average assessments for current costs are approximately $1.54
per hundred dollars payroll. This amount is far below the $2.85 figure which would
usually be used for purposes of comparison with other jurisdictions.
5. THE WORKPLACE SAFETY AND INSURANCE BOARD: MORE
CORPORATE AND MORE UNCARING
The Board has never been a tremendously worker-friendly place and has never been
completely free of the political agenda of the government of the day. However, prior
to the present administration, the Board always maintained a certain civility in
responding to worker concerns and always at least tried to maintain the appearance of
neutrality in its dealings between workers and employers.
A number of separate incidents that have occurred in the last year or so that have left
me with the very strong impression that the Board has become a very corporate kind
of place and is completely consumed by a corporate agenda. The pretext of neutrality
appears to be gone.
- The Chair of the Board appears to have stopped answering letters of concern
about the Board's policies that are addressed directly to him (or at least my let-
ters). Replies are routinely delegated to subordinates who have the technical
knowledge of the policies in question but lack the control of the board's corporate
agenda. While the chair is no doubt a busy person, this approach stands in stark
contrast to the approach of previous chairs Star, Alexander, Elgie and DiSanto,
who would at least sign the responses prepared for them by underlings. If nothing
else, the approach of the former chairs allowed them to keep on top of the con-
cerns of their constituents.
- The Board is organized along industry sector lines with absolutely no discussion
about, or safeguards put in place to protect against industry capture of Board
employees.
- The Board appoints customer service representatives to look after the needs of its
customers - defined as employers - without even acknowledging or apparently
recognizing how offensive this is to the concept of Board neutrality between
workers and employers.
- At a regional conference arranged by the Board to allow it to communicate with
its stakeholder community, a senior representative from the Operations Division
of the Board addressed the audience as the keynote speaker. The Board's repre-
sentative was unabashedly supportive of zero injury programs which are often
promoted by corporations but hated by unions and workers due to the pressures
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they create not to report or to hide any and all work related injuries. There did not
appear to be any awareness at all by the Board's representative that there might
be some problems with the Board promoting corporate zero injury programs.
- The Board continues to drag its heels in even reviewing its completely unjustifi-
able policy of stacking deemed employment earnings with income from Canada
Pension Plan disability benefits when estimating the projected post-injury earn-
ings of injured workers.
- I wrote to the Board about the termination of job search assistance supplements.
These supplements previously allowed a worker to survive a period of job search
as part of a labour market re-entry plan without resort to social assistance benefits
or without losing his or her house. The Vice President of the Board's Policy and
Research Division wrote back as follows:
In summary, the Board believes that the arbitrary 6 or 12 month extension of
"job search assistance" was a hollow benefit that did not guarantee an injured or
ill worker would be employed. 8
The Board is now apparently of the view that protecting injured workers from
foreseeable, unavoidable, catastrophic loss resulting from injuries is not a core
responsibility of the workers' compensation system but is instead an unnecessar-
ily expensive "hollow benefit" that needs to be eliminated.
In summary, the Board has become more distant and remote, less neutral, more
employer oriented and much more callous in its willingness to abandon injured
workers who are in need of financial support as a result of unavoidable losses due to
workplace injuries.
6. APPOINTMENTS TO THE WORKPLACE SAFETY AND INSURANCE
APPEALS TRIBUNAL: DE-SKILLING AND RE-POLITICISING THE
APPEALS TRIBUNAL
The former Chair of the Appeals Tribunal, Ron Ellis, has spoken out extensively on
the threats presented by the recent trends in appointments to the Appeals Tribunal.9 I
will not attempt to go over this topic in any detail given the much more detailed
knowledge of this subject that Mr. Ellis has. However, I didn't think that this issue
should go without notice in this paper and I wish to add some personal observations.
I have been active in the workers' compensation system since prior to 1985 and I was
unfortunate enough to experience the way that the final level of appeals before the
former Appeal Board were run at that time. The first formal hearing in the appeal
process took place before a Board staff member and was, generally speaking and
within understood limits, a quite satisfactory hearing. The final level of appeal, on the
8. Letter from L. Jolley to G. Dee (4 November 1998).
9. See, for e.g., R. Ellis, "An Administrative Justice System in Jeopardy" The IAVGO Reporting Ser-
vice, 12:1 (December 1997) 18.
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other hand, took place before largely part time panel members primarily chosen on
the basis of their political affiliation. This final level of appeal before the Appeal Board
was genuinely horrid. The contrast between the quality of the first appeal and the
awfulness of the second appeal had nothing to due with independence. Decision
makers at the first level of appeal had even less independence than the Appeal Board
members did. What the first level decision makers did have was experience derived
from long term employment by the Board and a sense of professionalism in their
approach to their duties.
The quality of decisions before the old Appeals Board was in fact so bad that when
the Appeals Tribunal was first created in 1985, special provisions were written into
the WCA to allow for the Tribunal to hear applications for reconsiderations of old
Appeal Board decisions. Much of the caseload of the Tribunal in its first years of
existence consisted of applications for reviews of old Appeal Board decisions. It took
a lot of effort to try to clean up the mess of human lives that had resulted from the old
Appeal Board decisions.
The current government of the day appears to be willing to risk repeating the errors
of the past. Fewer and fewer appointments to the Tribunal are now full-time. Experi-
enced full-time, qualified decision makers are being moved out or made part-time.
Part-time inexperienced members are being moved in. There is now a much greater
possibility that an appeal will be decided by a decision maker who is inexperienced.
Even with the passage of time, there is simply no way that these part-time members
will ever achieve the same level of competence as a full-time member would.
What is worse is that, true or not, there are rumours in existence that the reasons for
removals have to do with whether or not the members are viewed favourably by
employer side lawyers whose firms appear before the Tribunal and who also have the
ear of the Premier's office. The possible existence of patronage, while disappointing,
is not surprising. The possible -existence of patronage undiluted by concerns of
competence and tainted with bias is greatly distressing. Even if the rumours do not
reflect reality, these rumours are certainly a point of discussion in the worker advocate
community and faith in the administration of justice has been undermined. What is
certain is that the government has done nothing effective to dispel the rumours.
7. POLICY ISSUES AND THE WORKPLACE SAFETY AND INSURANCE
APPEALS TRIBUNAL
The Board has never been completely happy that there is an independent tribunal in
existence that can challenge its inherent right to interpret and administer workers'
compensation legislation. The Board was particularly unhappy with the lack of an
effective means of emerging triumphant when differences of opinion occurred
between itself and the Tribunal over matters of law and policy.
(1999) 14 Journal of Law and Social Policy
While the passage of the WSIA left in place an Appeals Tribunal that is separate and
distinct from the Board itself, through the passage of section 126 the Board was
granted the authority to require the Appeals Tribunal to adhere to its policies. '0
Having achieved the right to make its policies stick, it has been interesting (and
distressing) to see just how quickly the Board has moved to expand its demands for
authority over the Appeals Tribunal and further subvert its independence.
The Board has taken the view that the Tribunal must adhere not only to officially
minuted Board policy but also must adhere to any position that the Board solicitor
says is a Board policy, even where the position in question has not been approved by
the Board of Directors of the Board or by anyone delegated the authority from the
Board of Directors to approve policy.
For reasons known only to the Board, the Board has steadfastly maintained that it will
not recognize chronic stress claims made for workplace exposures prior to January 1,
1998, while at the same time it has refused to minute a policy that states this.
In the context of an appeal to the Appeals Tribunal regarding a pre-1998 stress claim,
the Board's solicitor wrote the following in a letter:
In addition, the Board's policy on claims for chronic stress prior to 1998 is as fol-
lows: the Board only compensates for claims of mental stress/psychological disabil-
ity resulting from an event that was sudden, shocking or life-threatening in nature.
In the absence of such an event, the Board does not compensate.1
When this attempt to assert that there was a Board policy was questioned by injured
worker advocates (including myself) the Appeals Tribunal wrote to the Board for
clarification regarding precisely what the Board believed its policy to be for the
purpose of section 126 of the Act. The Board solicitor's response included the
following:
In your letter, you suggested that the Board make generic submissions on what con-
stitutes Board "policy" for the purposes of s. 126 of the Workplace Safety and Insur-
ance Act. After careful consideration, the Board is declining this invitation. In the
Board's view, no useful purpose would be served by engaging in a general debate
over what constitutes "policy" within the meaning of s. 126. The Board's concern
is, that in dwelling on a preliminary issue, the process is side-tracked from the legis-
lated response for addressing any concerns about Board policies. Moreover, a pro-
tracted debate over the meaning of "policy" would only delay decision-making in
the cases before the Tribunal, thereby prolonging the strain, both emotional and
financial, on the parties to these appeals. In the Board's opinion, it is in the best
interests of all participants in the process to focus on the statutory scheme for
resolving policy concerns between the Board and the Tribunal.
10. WSIA, supra note 1, s.126.
11. As cited in Letter from P. Holyoke to I. Strachan (16 December 1998). Paul Holyoke is the Board's
General Counsel. Ian Strachan is the Appeals Tribunals' Chair.
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It is the role of the Board, under s. 126 of the Act, to state what policies apply in an
appeal before the Tribunal. Once the Board has stated the applicable policies, it is
up to the particular panel hearing the appeal to determine whether a stated policy is
"inconsistent with, or not authorized by, the Act or does not apply to the case". If
the panel determines that the policy falls within one of these categories, s. 126 pro-
vides a mechanism for the panel to refer the policy back to the board for review. In
the Board's view, this statutory process is the fastest and most efficient way to
ensure that matters before the Tribunal are resolved.
12
As of yet, the Appeals Tribunal has not responded to this attempted power grab by the
Board. 13
8. THE WORKPLACE SAFETY AND INSURANCE BOARD'S POLICY
DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLICATION PROCESSES
The Board's failure to understand and act upon its obligation to communicate the rules
it uses to decide claims is an ongoing one.
In January 1998 the Board published a soft bound book entitled Bill 99 Operational
Policies14 to be used to help interpret and apply the provisions of the WSIA.
The policies contained in this book were not minuted. There is no indication of why
the Board believes these policies to be authorized by its Board of Directors or any
other individual delegated authority from the Board of Directors "in writing" to
approve of these policies.' 5 There is no explanation of how these unminuted policies,
some of which are inconsistent with earlier minuted policies, are intended to interact
with the earlier minuted policies.
When the policies first came out there were questions about why these policies were
bound. Certainly the Board expected there to be a need for further policies or the
revision of the existing ones as the Board's experience with the new Act grew.
However, more than a year has now passed and no updates or revisions to the book
have been issued despite rumours of impending releases that have existed for over
nine months now.
The absence of published policies does not, however, mean that the Board has been
inactive on the policy development front. Whether authorized by the Board of Direc-
12. Ibid.
13. A complete copy of the December 16, 1998 letter as well as my January 7, 1999 submissions to the
Appeals Tribunal on this issue are contained in: The IAVGO Reporting Service 12:1 (15 February
1999).
14. Ontario Workplace Safety and Insurance Board, Bill 99 Operational Policies, (Toronto: Workplace
Safety and Insurance Board, 1 January 1998).
15. Under s.164, WSIA, supra note 1, the Board of Directors is given the authority to delegate any of its
powers or duties to a member of the Board of Directors or to an officer or employee of the Board.
However, "The delegation must be made in writing." Under s. 159(2), Ibid., the Board of Directors is
given the power to establish policies.
(1999) 14 Journal of Law and Social Policy
tors or not, the Board employees have been generating documents that are intended to
be used in the adjudication of claims by other Board employees. Other communica-
tions to external stakeholders make reference to standards in adjudication used by the
Board that do not appear anywhere else but the communications themselves.
If you wish to know what the Board's approach is to the entitlement of an injured
worker to further services and benefits following layoff from an employer, for
example, it would be unwise to rely on the Board's policy manuals or the more recent
Bill 99 Operational Policies alone. You should also look at the letter from Linda Jolley,
Vice President, Policy and Research, to Michael Green, a Toronto lawyer.
16
If you want to know the Board's approach to applying the new limitation periods
contained in the Act you must track down a copy of the internal memorandum
co-authored by Paul Gilkinson, Acting Director, Appeals Branch, and Pat Lamanna,
Director, Small Business Services, Ottawa Office.
17
Similarly, for the Board's required response to federal government orders to pay, you
must look at a memorandum from Paul Holyoke, General Counsel, Legal Services
Division. 18
In case you think that this is a new problem for the Board, think again. For example,
perhaps the most influential document regarding the termination of section 147(4)
supplements at review periods is an undated document from around March 1995 again
from Paul Gilkinson, who was then temporarily performing the work of "The Review
Team Co-ordinator". The document is entitled "Operating Principles 147(4) 60 Month
Reviews" and not published or minuted.
Authorized Board policies that are published and maintained and amended when
required are the main tool that the Board has of ensuring consistency of adjudication
and adherence to the rule of law. It is also the main tool that the Board's senior
management can provide to give guidance to its adjudicative staff in how they carry
out the decisions that they must continually make on a day by day basis.
In the absence of leadership from the Board of Directors or senior management of the
Board, it is inevitable that Board staff will generate documents to fill these gaps.
However, being "unofficial" documents, there is no method for these documents to
achieve formal distribution outside of the organization. The Board's neglect of its
requirement to make and publish its rules of entitlement in a timely manner, speaks
volumes about the priority it currently provides to quality adjudication and the proper
management of its adjudicative staff.
16. Letter from L. Jolley to M. Green (28 May, 1998).
17. Memorandum from P. Gilkinson & P. Lamanna titled "Update - Appeal Time Limits" (August
1998).
18. Memorandum from P. Holyoke to Managers and Above titled "Diversion of Compensation Benefits
to Revenue Canada" (23 November 1998).
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9. OUTSOURCING LABOUR MARKET RE-ENTRY SERVICES
There are at least two potentially positive aspects to the Board's decision to outsource
the provision of vocational rehabilitation (VR) services.
First, by distancing themselves from the rehabilitation process, the Board has finally
found the courage to identify re-employment as the performance objective for voca-
tional rehabilitation.
While it might appear quite obvious that re-employment should be the objective of
vocational rehabilitation, since the advent of the wage loss system, the Board has
always feared the consequences of such a position. If the Board accepted that its
obligation was to actually achieve re-employment as opposed to achieving re-employ-
ability, the Board feared that it would become responsible for all of the wage loss
associated with those workers who did not become re-employed. Good bye deeming.
Hello increased assessment rates.
In order to maintain the ability to deem, the Board felt the need to state that having
provided the worker with employability that their responsibility was ended.
The negative consequences of the employability charade, beyond allowing the Board
to dump the costs of work related injuries onto the backs of injured workers and away
from the Board, is that it prevented the Board from effectively targeting programs that
were specifically designed to break down employment barriers external to the worker
in order to achieve re-employment. It also prevented the Board from evaluating the
success of rehabilitation programs on the criteria used by injured workers (namely,
employment and not employability).
The Board has now stated to its external vocational rehabilitation service providers
that, while the Board's goal continues to be employability (and therefore implicitly
that deeming will continue), the providers will be evaluated not upon their success in
obtaining employability but instead upon their success in achieving actual re-employ-
ment. This must be regarded as a good thing for injured workers.
This brings us to the second potentially positive aspect of the outsourcing of rehabil-
itation services. The Board is apparently proceeding with attempts to reliably evaluate
the performance of its service providers in achieving re-employment.
While the provision of information does not guarantee information based manage-
ment, it is at least a necessary first step. Assuming that an appropriate evaluation
program is fully implemented, the real issue will then become whether or not the Board
is willing to act upon the information it obtains through the evaluation process. This
would ensure that the outsourcing of vocational rehabilitation services goes to those
service providers that are most successful at achieving injured worker re-employment.
10. HOLES IN THE RE-EMPLOYMENT/ WAGE Loss SYSTEM
When the re-employment provisions of the workers' compensation system work well,
the pre-injury employer can play a beneficial role in the rehabilitation and re-employ-
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ment of the injured worker that in many instances could not be duplicated by any other
means. However, when the re-employment provisions do not work well, the result of
the WSIB's approach to compensation can cause absolutely brutal consequences for
an injured worker.
I would like to focus on three aspects of the wage loss system in which serious
problems occur whenever there is a break down of the re-employment process. These
aspects are:
- dealing with employer hardball tactics
- failure to adequately compensate when the re-employment relationship ends; and
- the injured worker's loss of liberty.
A. Employer Hardball Tactics
The extent to which employers resort to hardball tactics in workers' compensation
matters is a topic that is hotly contested. For the purpose of this paper it is not necessary
to speculate on the extent to which employers resort to such tactics, it is only necessary
to state that they do exist to some undetermined extent and that when used, these tactics
can effectively deny workers' compensation assistance to those injured workers who
should in fact receive such assistance.
The following examples illustrate some of the unfair tactics that may be utilized by
those employers who choose to aggressively pursue the minimization of compensation
assessments.
i) The Bogus Job Offer
A bogus job offer might be used by an employer in the situation where an injured
worker has strong reservations about his or her ability to return to work but where the
Board is convinced that the worker could return to work although likely at the
minimum wage. This tactic usually involves a highly modified (and sometimes quite
unrealistic) job that barely meets all of the worker's physical restrictions. The offer is
usually for wages at or near the pre-injury wage. The offer is made in the hopes that
it will be rejected. If the job offer is refused, future loss of earnings benefits are based
on the wages offered by the employer. If the job offer is accepted, the employer
develops second thoughts and suddenly finds that the job is either a) not authorized
by senior management, b) unrealistic in the long run, or c) suddenly unavailable due
to unforseen circumstances. Alternatively, the employer may actually follow through
with the job offer for a short period of time until financial circumstances that are
"unrelated to the injury" require a downsizing of the workforce. There are no negative
consequences to an employer for making a bogus job offer. There are serious reper-
cussions to an injured worker in refusing one.
ii) The Suddenly Permanent Job Offer
The suddenly permanent job offer is similar to the bogus job offer. In this scenario the
employer brings the worker back to temporary modified work which may or may not
be part of a legitimate return to work program offered by the employer. In reality, there
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are no prospects of the job becoming permanent. However, should the worker decline
to perform the work, the job suddenly becomes permanent.
iii) The Physically Suitable But Otherwise Not Suitable Job Offer
This tactic is perhaps the most prevalent tactic used to achieve the aggressive
employer's objective of reducing workers' compensation assessments without actually
having to keep the injured worker employed. The idea is to offer a job that is physically
suitable but which will be refused by the injured worker either immediately or after a
predictably short period of performance. Even where the employer's intentions are
genuine, the dilemma posed to injured workers remains the same when work is offered
that is physically, but not otherwise, suitable. Examples abound:
A single parent or older worker is offered a job on the night shift, or on erratically
variable shifts when the pre-injury work was straight days.
Work is offered at another location of the employer that requires an extensive com-
mute or relocation inconsistent with the worker's family obligations or the contin-
ued employment of the worker's spouse.
A high skilled, high wage worker is offered a low status menial job paid at a pre-
mium but performed before, or for, co-workers or former subordinates.
A position with a high rate of turnover due to its boring, menial nature is offered on
a sequential basis to a series of permanently injured workers.
Formerly, Board policies under the WCA provided some protection against this
potential abuse in providing for restrictions on the geographic area that a worker was
required to look for or accept work in 19 and by requiring an employer, during the period
of the re-employment obligation, to offer the "most suitable job" that is "most
comparable in nature and earnings to the worker's pre- injury job". 20 Former voca-
tional rehabilitation policies also provide other indications that the worker's skills and
attributes should be taken into consideration in establishing vocational rehabilitation
goals.
Currently Board policies under the WSIA define suitable work as follows:
Any work that:
- the worker has the necessary skills to perform, or the worker is able to acquire
the necessary skills to perform, and
- does not pose a health or safety risk to the worker or co-workers.21
19. Ontario, Workers' Compensation Board, Operational Policy, "Vocational Rehabilitation (VR) Plan-
ning: Identifying a Vocational Rehabilitation (VR) Objecitve", Document No. 07-02-08 (Toronto:
Workers' Compensation Board, 7 April 1993).
20. Ibid., "Re-employment: Suitable Employment", Document No. 07-05-10 (30 April 1991).
21. Supra note 14, "Re-Employment Provisions: Suitable Employment", Document 9.5 at 1.
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The restrictions contained in the previous Board policies referred to above have not
been continued into the Board's new policies. The potential for unacceptable job offers
has increased substantially.
B. Failure to Adequately Compensate When the Re-Employment
Relationship Ends
Often the work that the worker returns to with the accident employer is modified in
some way to meet the needs of the injured worker. Common accommodations might
include:
- variations in the manner in which a job is to be performed;
- the provision of assistive devices to allow the job to be performed;
- a lessening of performance requirements in the job;
- the employer's maintenance of higher than usual wages in the post-injury employ-
ment.
So long as the worker remains employed, the Future Economic Loss (FEL) payments
or Loss Of Earnings (LOE) payments provide adequate compensation to the injured
worker to compensate for the loss of wages, if any. The difficulty occurs when the
employment relationship ends. Despite the fact that the termination of the employment
relationship may have been beyond the control of the worker and there is no reasonable
prospect of obtaining a job with the same rate of pay with some other employer, there
is no right to a redetermination of the wage loss benefits based on the change of
circumstances.
The recalculation of FEL payments in these circumstances is governed by Board
policy, the relevant portions of which indicate as follows:
If workers are unemployed at the time of the review because of circumstances not
related to the work injury, and they were employed at Dl, the decision-maker bases
the FEL on the greater of
- the most recent report of a material change of circumstances, or
- the gross wages of the suitable job the worker was performing at D1 [i.e., sixty
months from the date of dtermination] or the last 24 month variable review.22
In other words, the worker's FEL benefits are based on a job that the worker no longer
has and at wages that the worker cannot realistically hope to repeat.
The recalculation of LOE payments in these circumstances is governed by a different
Board policy. The section of this policy dealing with potential increases in the LOE
states the following:
The LOE benefit is increased, based on the 5% threshold, if the reduction in post-
accident earnings is due to the work-related injury. This could include, but is not
limited to a
22. Ibid., "Future Economic Loss (FESL): Review of FEL Benefit", Document 7.13 at 3.
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- recurrence...
- deterioration in the worker's impairment, resulting in lower earnings...
- job change due to the work-related injury resulting in lower earnings. 23
Again, the likely result of this policy is that LOE benefits will not be increased despite
the lower earnings that can be expected upon the loss of the modified employment.
The difficulty with both of these policies is that they focus on the reason for losing
employment. While the work related injury may not have had any role to play in
bringing about the termination of the re-employment relationship, the work related
injury is very likely playing a profound role in the diminution of the injured worker's
ability to replicate the wage achieved in re-employment.
In addition to the above policies, there is a letter from Linda Jolley, the Board's Vice
President of Policy and Research, which indicates a slightly different approach. It is
not clear what status this letter has as Board policy (see the discussion in Section 8,
above). According to this letter:
If a worker successfully returns to modified work under s. 40 but is subsequently
laid off, the decision-maker must ascertain the reason for the lay off when consider-
ing any further entitlement under the Act. Primarily, the decision- maker must deter-
mine whether the lay off is employment related, i.e. plant closure, or related to the
injury; for example the job is not within the worker's functional abilities.
In most cases, if a worker becomes unemployed for reasons unrelated to the work-
related injury, the Board will not provide benefits or services because the worker
would have been in the same position in the absence of an injury. However, if the
worker has a significant impairment and the post-injury job was heavily accommo-
dated, the Board will assess the worker with regard to entitlement to [a Labour Mar-
ket Re-entry] plan. In these cases the worker may be entitled to benefits and
services following lay off.24
While the contents of this letter, if followed, might provide some relief for some
injured workers, for the most part an injured worker returned to work in accommo-
dated employment is at considerable risk of significant under compensation if for any
reason, including reasons completely beyond the control of the worker, the accommo-
dated employment should come to an end.
23. Ibid., "Loss of Earnings (LOE): Reviewing LOE Benefits", Document 5.5 at 2. The "5% threshold"
referred to above is explained at 1:
In determining whether a change in earnings is material or not, decision-makers compare
the recently reported gross earnings with the escalated gross earnings being used to pay the
IOE benefit. If the comparison demonstrates that there is a 5% or greater change in the
gross earnings, this is considered a material change and leads to either an increase or
reduction in the LOE benefits. Each time new gross earnings are reported, they are compared
to the escalated gross earnings used to calculate the current LOE benefit, and the 5% or
greater threshold is applied.
24. Supra note 16.
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C. Loss of Liberty
It is not possible to credibly dispute the need to make injured workers responsible for
ensuring that they make reasonable efforts to mitigate their losses. It would be a
distortion of the workers' compensation system to require compensation for self-
imposed financial losses. However, it is very evident that in the present workers'
compensation process, the standard imposed upon injured workers is not a reasonable-
ness standard but is instead a standard which requires injured workers to maximize
post-injury earning capacity, regardless of personal consequences.
This issue has already been touched on to some extent in the preceding section of this
paper dealing with the obligation to accept work which is physically, but not otherwise,
suitable. It is also an issue which arises outside of the re-employment context in labour
market re-entry plans where the plans are accepted or rejected solely upon the potential
of the plan to create the smallest possible financial outlay by the Board.
Within the re-employment process, where workers have returned to work, there often
develop situations where the injured worker would like to (need to) take a temporary
leave from the work force (unpaid) or quit their job to go to another but cannot do so
as they have no prospects for obtaining employment elsewhere at similar wages due
to the effects of their work related injuries. The lack of an option to obtain alternative
work at similar wages leaves the worker vulnerable to abuse from both the accident
employer and co-workers.
In the present re-employment process, a permanently injured worker cannot under any
circumstances voluntarily quit a job and then have wage loss benefits redetermined
based on a fair determination of his or her earning potential in the job force without
reference to the wages that were being earned in re-employment with the accident
employer. This would even include situations of racial discrimination, emotional abuse
and sexual assault.
Contrast this approach with that of the employment insurance system which shares
the same concern of ensuring that workers are not rewarded for self-imposed wage
loss. In the employment insurance system, there are a number of prescribed circum-
stances wherein a worker might quit a job and still remain eligible for employment
insurance benefits.
Section 30(1) of the Employment Insurance Act,25 reads as follows:
30(1) A claimant is disqualified from receiving benefits if the claimant lost any
employment because of their misconduct or voluntarily left any employment with-
out just cause...
Section 29(c) of the Employment Insurance Act defines "just cause" as follows:
25. S.C. 1996, c.23.
Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997
29(c) just cause for voluntarily leaving an employment or taking leave from an
employment exists if the claimant had no reasonable alternative to leaving or taking
leave, having regard to all the circumstances, including any of the following:
(i) sexual or other harassment,
(ii) obligation to accompany a spouse or dependent child to another resi-
dence,
(iii) discrimination on a prohibited ground of discrimination within the
meaning of the Canadian Human Rights Act,
(iv) working conditions that constitute a danger to health or safety,
(v) obligation to care for a child or a member of the immediate family,
(vi) reasonable assurance of another employment in the immediate future,
(vii) significant modification of terms and conditions respecting wages or
salary,
(viii) excessive overtime work or refusal to pay for overtime work,
(ix) significant changes in work duties,
(x) antagonism with a supervisor if the claimant is not primarily responsi-
ble for the antagonism,
(xi) practices of an employer that are contrary to law,
(xii) discrimination with regard to employment because of membership in
an association, organization or union of workers,
(xiii) undue pressure by an employer on the claimant to leave their employ-
ment, and
(xiv) any other reasonable circumstances that are prescribed. 26
While this list in its entirety may not be precisely what is appropriate for the workers'
compensation system, there is no reason why the principles that are intended to be
achieved by this list should not be incorporated into the Ontario workers' compensa-
tion system.
At the present time these principles do not apply in the workers' compensation system.
The standard of mitigation expected from injured workers who are dependent for their
earnings on the accident employer is instead set so high as to require injured workers
to suffer abuse, ignore health and safety issues and ignore reasonable family needs if
they wish to maintain the same level of income as they did prior to their injury. For
the individual worker, this is a serious deficiency in the re-employment process.
26. Ibid.
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CONCLUSION
Workers' compensation in Ontario has gone through a tremendous number of changes
in the recent past. These changes have been motivated by the desire to lessen employer
assessment rates and to improve the Board's balance sheet.
Unfortunately, in order to achieve these objectives of the employers of the province,
the government and the Board have chosen to minimize or ignore a number of
legitimate expectations that workers have of the workers' compensation system. Basic
protection against the catastrophic loss from work related injury is worse now than it
has been for many years.
Employer side objectives for competitive assessment rates and higher funding ratios
are not going to go away and cannot be ignored. In my opinion it is vital to attack these
issues, not by denying the validity of the employer objectives, but instead by attacking
the misinformation produced by employers and the Board that has predominated this
debate and exaggerates the extent and urgency of the problems that the employer
community complains about.
While there are a number of process issues pertaining to such matters as the dissemi-
nation of policy and the legitimacy of the appeal process that workers and employers
should be able to work on together in dealing with the Board and the government, it
is also of vital importance that the worker community continue to fight back on its
own, in order to ensure that its legitimate interests in the workers' compensation
system are no longer ignored.
